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Letter to Congress 
March 2, 2015 
To Members of the United States Congress: 
We, the undersigned, are economics and legal scholars who study innovation, 
intellectual property law, and policy.  We write to respond to lobbyists and others who claim 
there is little empirical evidence available to assess the performance of the American patent 
system. In fact, a large and increasing body of evidence indicates that the net effect of patent 
litigation is to raise the cost of innovation and inhibit technological progress, subverting the 
very purpose of the patent system. As members of Congress debate reforms to improve the 
patent system we hope they appreciate the failings of the current system, and implement 
salutary reforms. 
Over the last five years, academic researchers have published over two dozen 
empirical studies on patent litigation and its economic impacts (see the attached bibliography 
for a selection). These studies have been conducted by researchers with diverse views and 
using different methodologies.  
The preponderant economic picture these studies present is that patent litigation 
now imposes substantial costs, particularly on small and innovative firms, and that these 
costs have tended overall to reduce R&D, venture capital investment, and firm startups. Not 
one study of the economic impact of current patent litigation concludes that the effects are 
negligible. 
The number of defendants in patent lawsuits filed in 2009 was five times the annual 
number during the 1980s. By most tallies, the majority of lawsuits are now filed by so-called 
“patent assertion entities” (PAEs), popularly known as patent trolls. Estimates based on 
surveys, on firm 10-K filings, and on stock prices suggest that PAE litigation has been 
costing firms tens of billions of dollars per year since 2007. Startups and venture-backed 
firms, especially, report significant operational impacts from PAE lawsuits in survey-based 
studies. An econometric analysis finds that the more R&D a firm performs, the more likely it 
is to be hit with a patent lawsuit, all else equal. Another study associates lawsuits from PAEs 
with a decline of billions of dollars of venture capital investment; another found that 
extensive lawsuits caused small firms to sharply reduce R&D spending; and yet another 
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found that costly lawsuits caused publicly listed defendant firms to substantially curtail R&D 
spending. 
Although each of these studies has limitations and none is conclusive by itself, a 
consistent picture emerges: the patent system provides strong protection without excessive 
litigation in some sectors such as pharmaceuticals, but substantial evidence highlights serious 
problems with patent litigation in many other industries.  Even if the patent system on the 
whole promotes innovation, it does so despite the social costs that result from this litigation, 
not because of it.  
Congress, the courts, and the Patent and Trademark Office have all made changes in 
recent years that help mitigate this problem. The Inter Partes Review and Covered Business 
Method proceedings established by the America Invents Act of 2011 have helped remove 
hundreds of invalid patents, many already involved in litigation. Supreme Court decisions 
have strengthened patentability standards and have somewhat lowered the hurdles to fee-
shifting in patent cases. Perhaps as a result, patent lawsuit filings declined modestly last year 
from the record setting level of 2013. While month-to-month comparisons are variable, 18% 
fewer patent lawsuits were filed last year than in 2013.  
Nevertheless, patent litigation rates remain at detrimentally high levels. Indeed, much 
of the empirical research mentioned above covers periods prior to the last several record-
breaking years for patent litigation. That is, the research demonstrates that patent lawsuits 
were already harming innovation when litigation rates were significantly below current levels. In 
this light we are not surprised that a growing chorus of high-tech entrepreneurs and state 
attorneys general has stepped forward to urge that the patent system should work for 
innovators and not against them. Though we understand that crafting and implementing 
effective reform will be difficult, we write to emphasize the rewards from effective reform 
could be great. 
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Sincerely,

   
 
Clark D. Asay 
Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School 
 
Jonathan Askin 
Brooklyn Law School 
 
Carliss Y. Baldwin 
Harvard Business School 
 
James E. Bessen 
Boston University School of Law 
 
Jeremy W. Bock 
The University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law 
 
Michele Boldrin 
Washington University in St. Louis Department of Economics 
 
Michael J. Burstein 
Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law 
 
Andrew Chin 
University of North Carolina School of Law 
 
Lauren Cohen 
Harvard Business School 
 
Wesley Cohen 
Duke University Fuqua School of Business 
 
Kevin Collins 
Washington University in St. Louis School of Law 
 
Jorge Contreras 
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law & Department of Human Genetics 
 
Robert Cook-Deegan 
Duke University Sanford School of Public Policy 
 
Ben Depoorter 
University of California Hastings College of Law 
 
                                                 
 This letter presents the views of the individual signers. Institutions are listed for 
identification purposes only. 
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Samuel F. Ernst 
Chapman University Fowler School of Law 
 
Robin Feldman 
University of California Hastings College of the Law 
 
Lee Fleming 
University of California Berkeley 
 
Roger Allan Ford 
University of New Hampshire School of Law 
 
Brian L. Frye 
University of Kentucky College of Law 
 
William T. Gallagher 
Golden Gate University School of Law 
 
Shubha Ghosh 
University of Wisconsin Law School 
 
Eric Goldman 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
 
Umit G. Gurun 
The University of Texas at Dallas Naveen Jindal School of Management 
 
Bronwyn H. Hall 
University of California Berkeley Department of Economics 
 
Christian Helmers 
Santa Clara University Leavey School of Business 
 
Joachim Henkel 
Technische Universität München School of Management 
 
Cynthia Ho 
Loyola University of Chicago School of Law 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp 
University of Iowa College of Law 
 
Ben Klemens 
U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Scott Duke Kominers 
Harvard University 
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Amy Landers 
Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law 
 
Mark A. Lemley 
Stanford Law School 
 
David K. Levine 
Washington University in St. Louis Department of Economics 
 
Yvette Joy Liebesman 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
 
Brian J. Love 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
 
Phil Malone 
Stanford Law School 
 
Michael J. Meurer 
Boston University School of Law 
 
Joseph S. Miller 
University of Georgia School of Law 
 
Ira Steven Nathenson 
St. Thomas University School of Law 
 
Jacob H. Rooksby 
Duquesne University School of Law 
 
Pamela Samuelson 
University of California Berkeley School of Law 
 
Sharon K. Sandeen 
Hamline University School of Law 
 
F.M. Scherer 
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government 
 
Roger Smeets 
Rutgers Business School 
 
Talha Syed 
University of California Berkeley School of Law 
 
Alexander Tabarrok 
George Mason University Department of Economics 
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Toshiko Takenaka 
University of Washington School of Law 
 
John L. Turner 
University of Georgia Terry College of Business & Department of Economics 
 
Ryan G. Vacca 
The University of Akron School of Law 
 
Eric von Hippel 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management 
 
Jonathan W. Williams 
University of Georgia Terry College of Business & Department of Economics 
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